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Introduction 
 This article analyzes the viability of the National Hockey League Players Association’s 
recklessness and negligence claims against the National Hockey League for its liability relating to 
traumatic brain injuries.1  In doing so, Part I of this article explores the overtly physical and violent-
laden culture that is deeply-rooted within the sport of professional ice hockey.  Additionally, Part 
I will examine the general nature of the allegations contained within the National Hockey League 
Concussion Litigation.  Following this brief overview, Part II of this article outlines the American 
legal perspectives relating to tortious liability for injuries sustained as a result of player to player 
conduct.  To illustrate the potential application of such tort law principles with regards to 
professional ice hockey-related claims, this section will analyze various case law, as well as the 
events that occurred on January 27, 2016, in which NHL Linesman, Don Henderson, was 
forcefully struck in his neck/head by Calgary Flames defenseman, Dennis Wideman.2  Thereafter, 
Part III discusses the implications of the legal standards depicted in Part II in an attempt to 
determine the general viability of the Players claims against the League.3  Additionally, this section 
                                                          
1 See Complaint for Damages and Demand for Jury Trial, Leeman, v. National Hockey League, Civil Case No. 13-
CV-1856 (U.S. Dist. Ct. D.C., Nov. 25, 2013), see e.g., Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Consolidated Class Action 
Complaint, In Re: National Hockey League Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation, MDL No. 14-2551 (SRN/JSM) 
(D. Minn.) (On November 25, 2013, the first of five proposed class action cases were filed by over two dozen former 
National Hockey League players against the National Hockey League [hereinafter “NHL” or “League”]. On August 
19, 2014, the Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation ordered that all similar cases by former players against the 
NHL were to be centralized and transferred to the District of Minnesota under the assignment of the Honorable Susan 
Richard Nelson); see also In Re: National Hockey League Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation, MDL No. 14-2551 
(SRN/JSM) (D. Minn.) available at: http://www.nhlconcussionlitigation.com/information.html (the National Hockey 
League Players Association [hereinafter “NHLPA” or “Players”] generally allege that the NHL, as evidenced by the 
League’s promotion and glorification of unreasonable and unnecessary violence, acted negligently by failing to warn 
and adequately protect players from the adverse effects of repeated concussions and head trauma) [hereinafter “NHL 
Concussion Litigation”]. 
2 See generally Josh Cooper, NHL Linesman Don Henderson Had Neck Surgery From Dennis Wideman Hit: Report, 
July 31, 2016 available at http://sports.yahoo.com/news/nhl-linesman-don-henderson-had-neck-surgery-from-
dennis-wideman-hit-report-192054868.html.  
3 The scope of section is specifically limited to the Players’ tort-related negligence claims against the League.  
Accordingly, issues concerning labor law and the validity of scientific data relating to Chronic Traumatic 
Encephalopathy (hereinafter “CTE”) and concussions will not be analyzed for purposes of this article.  
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explores the violent nature of professional ice hockey and how excessive violence within the sport 
of hockey poses unique challenges for claimants relating to causation and the doctrine of 
assumption of risk.  
I. From the Ice to the Courts – A Glance into the Violent Culture of Ice Hockey 
 Professional ice hockey is arguably the most dangerous and violent sport ever created.4  
While other professional contact sports are fixated on physical and often violent interactions 
between competitors, professional ice hockey is nevertheless more dangerous for three main 
reasons.  First, the intrinsic elements of the game make professional ice hockey inherently more 
dangerous and violent than any other professional contact sport.  Specifically, ice hockey is the 
only sport in which players compete on an enclosed ice surface, surrounded by steel-stiffened 
boards, all while attempting to body-check opponents at speeds upwards of twenty miles-per-
hour.5  Moreover, ice hockey is the only sport in which participants are armed with light-weight 
composite sticks, plastic-reinforced padding and a helmet that often provides minimal to no facial 
protection.  Given the physical nature of the game, its enclosed surface, ultra-fast pace, and 
minimal yet tactical equipment, the propensity for on-ice violence has become more prevalent than 
ever.6 
                                                          
4 See generally Jeff Yates and William Gillespie, The Problem of Sports Violence and the Criminal Prosecution 
Solution, 12 Cornell J.L. & Pub. Pol’y 145, 150-60 (2002) (hereinafter “Yates & Gillespie”). 
5 Reed Albergotti, Setting a Speed Trap in Vancouver, The Wall Street Journal, Feb. 26, 2010, available at: 
http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB10001424052748704479404575087542656588862 discussing the average speed of 
an Olympic hockey player.  
6 See Nicola Joyce, Too Many Men on the Ice?: Why Criminal Prosecutors Should Refrain From Policing On-Ice 
Violence in the NHL, The Harvard John M. Olin Fellow’s Discussion Paper Series, No. 9 (2007) (hereinafter 
“Joyce”). Suggesting the violent nature of professional ice hockey is in part due to the official NHL rules that permit 
forceful body-checking and fighting.  
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Second, unlike other professional athletes, ice hockey players are widely renowned for 
their extreme toughness and otherworldly pain threshold.7  As one commentator noted, 
“professional athletes are tough, but no athlete in the world is tougher than the professional ice 
hockey player […] and hockey players prove that on a daily basis.8  In fact, researchers recently 
concluded that from 2009 to 2012, more than 63 percent of the 1,307 NHL players missed at least 
one regular season game due to an injury sustained during the course of play.9  Additionally, such 
studies have also found a correlation between an increase in the total number of injuries per-season, 
specifically concussions, as the average players’ height and weight increased over the past few 
decades.10  Notwithstanding these alarming results, professional hockey players have become 
notorious for playing through the pain and continuing to compete, despite suffering gruesome 
facial lacerations, broken bones, dislodged teeth, and even concussions.11 
                                                          
7 See generally Rich Clune, The Battle, The Players’ Tribune, July 1, 2015 available at: 
http://www.theplayerstribune.com/rich-clune-hockey-nhl/.  Having formerly played at the professional level, Clune 
notes that hockey players “are programmed to never, ever admit to pain.” (hereinafter “Clune”) 
8 Paul McCoun, The 10 Greatest Examples of Hockey-Tough, Jan. 12, 2010, available at: 
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/324477-the-10-greatest-examples-of-hockey-tough.  Detailing numerous incidents 
in which players remained in the game or returned to play despite being severely injured during the course of the 
game.  For example, during Game six of the 2003 Stanley Cup finals, Anaheim Mighty Ducks forward, Paul Kariya, 
was knocked unconscious by New Jersey Devils defenseman, Scott Stevens.  Despite suffering a concussion, Kariya 
missed only 11 minutes of play before scoring a crucial goal to force game seven;  Joe McDonald, Gregory 
Campbell Breaks Leg, Jun. 7, 2013 available at: http://www.espn.com/boston/nhl/story/_/id/9347725/2013-nhl-
playoffs-gregory-campbell-boston-bruins-breaks-leg-done-postseason.  Discussing an incident in which Boston 
Bruins Forward, Gregory Campbell sacrificed his body to block a slap shot.  Despite shattering his right fibula, 
Campbell remained on the ice (skating) for over a minute and even recorded another blocked shot before exiting the 
game.  
9 The Hockey News, Injuries Cost NHL $218 Million A Year in Lost Salaries, A Wallop to Bottom Line, Study, The 
Canadian Press, Jan. 20, 2014 available at: http://www.thehockeynews.com/news/article/injuries-cost-nhl-218m-a-
year-in-lost-salaries-a-wallop-to-bottom-line-study. 
10 See generally Richard A. Wennberg and Charles H. Tator, Concussion Incidence and Time Lost from Play in the 
NHL During the Past Ten Years, 35 Ca. J. of Neurol. Sci. 647 (2008). 
11 See e.g., Brandon Prust, Why We Fight, The Players’ Tribune, Feb. 3, 2015 available at: 
http://www.theplayerstribune.com/why-we-fight/.  Former Teammate Brandon Prust recalls New York Rangers 
forward, Derek Stepan, remained in the game despite suffering a broken jaw (hereinafter “Prust”); Joe Smith, Tampa 
Bay Lightning’s Steven Stamkos Plays Through Bloody Nose After Being Hit in Face by Puck, Tampa Bay Times, 
May 27, 2011 available at: http://www.tampabay.com/sports/hockey/lightning/tampa-bay-lightnings-steven-
stamkos-plays-through-bloody-nose-after-being/1172312. Tampa Bay Lightning Forward, Steven Stamkos, was 
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Third and most notably, professional ice hockey is the only sport where fighting is openly 
recognized as a component of the sport but the outcome of the fight has no direct bearing on which 
team will be victorious.12  Thus, by virtue of allowing players to fight, the National Hockey League 
“remains the only major league in which violence is, if not quite institutionalized, nevertheless 
actively encouraged.”13  Although technically a violation of the official rules in which those 
involved in an altercation serve a mere five-minute penalty,14 fighting is often demanded and even 
praised by fans and players alike.15  Yet aside from the fan-excitement generated when two players 
square-up in an attempt to beat one another to a bloody pulp, many critics have scrutinized the 
National Hockey League for refusing to acknowledge the dangers associated with fighting and 
allowing fighting to remain a part of today’s modern game.16   
Nonetheless, many proponents for fighting contend that fighting is a natural consequence 
that arises in part because physicality and violence are inescapable elements of the game.17  
Moreover, as the National Hockey League expanded and became more popular over time, it 
became apparent that not all fights were initiated as a result of such inescapable elements.  Rather 
on-ice violence—in the form of fighting—was seen as a unique mechanism of self-policing, as 
                                                          
dubbed a “warrior” when he opted to return to the game despite suffering a broken nose and multiple stiches from a 
slap shot to the face. 
12 See e.g., Joyce, supra note 6; The Associated Press, Bettman Says Safety in Hockey Is Issue, Not Fighting, The 
New York Times, Mar. 27, 2007 available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2007/03/27/sports/hockey/27nhl.html. 
13 See J.C.H Jones and Kenneth G. Stewart, Hit Somebody: Hockey Violence, Economics, the Law and the Twist and 
McSorley decisions, 12 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 165, at 167 (2002).  
14 National Hockey League Official Rules 2015-2016, Rule 46, Fighting, available at: 
http://www.nhl.com/nhl/en/v3/ext/rules/2015-2016-Interactive-rulebook.pdf (2015). 
15 See Joyce, supra note 6 at 1. 
16 See Carter Anne McGowan, The Other Skate Drops: The NHL Concussion Lawsuit, 25 NYSBA Entertainment, 
Arts and Sport L. J., at 26 (2014). Discussing the correlation between the violent nature of hockey, specifically 
fighting, in relation to an increase in the number of concussions suffered per-season. 
17 Joyce, supra note 6 at 1-4; see e.g., Barbara Svoranos, Fighting? It’s all in a Day’s Work on the Ice: Determining 
the Appropriate Standard of a Hockey Player’s Liability to Another Player, 7 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 487, 490 (1997) 
[hereinafter “Svoranos”]; Gregory Schiller, Are Athletes Above the Law? From a Two-Minute Minor to a Twenty-
Year Sentence: Regina v. Marty McSorley, 10 Sports Law J. 241, 264-65 (2003).  
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well as a primary tactic used to intimidate, punish, and deter opponents from taking cheap-shots 
at the more talented and skillful players on one’s team.18  As fighting developed as a method for 
instilling fear and justice upon opponents, many teams began employing larger, more aggressive 
players known as “enforcers.”19  Generally, the enforcers were valued for their physicality and 
willingness to fight, rather than finesse or skill.20  Comparable to on-ice body-guards, the enforcers 
presence alone gave teammates a sense of security while on the ice.21  Ordinarily, enforcers 
generally received minimal ice-time.  But despite spending most of the game on the bench, 
enforcers were often times ordered onto the ice to instigate a momentum-changing fight or to 
“deliver preemptive or retributive hits for questionable actions of opposing players.”22   
Despite the oxymoronic rationale of preventing violence via practicing violence, many 
current and former players have noted that fighting is needed in order to keep the game safe.23  For 
example, if an opposing player were to take advantage of a smaller, better-skilled, or vulnerable 
player, the enforcer on the victim’s team will often intervene by initiating a fight or responding 
with a retributive hit of his own.  Thus, the enforcer’s role is to physically inform the opposing 
team that their player’s actions will not be tolerated, regardless of whether he acted within the 
confines of the rules.  Consequently, the enforcer’s deterrent effect will often times force the 
                                                          
18 See Stu Hackel, The Morning Skate: HBO Makes ‘Broad Street Bullies’ a Love Story, The New York Times 
(2010), available at: http://slapshot.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/05/03/the-morning-skate-hbo-makes-broad-street-
bullies-a-love-story/(Characterized as a “tooth-less army of larger-than-life players including, Dave ‘The Hammer’ 
Schultz, Bobby Clarke, and Bernie Parent,” the 1970’s Philadelphia Flyers (known as “The Broad Street Bullies”) 
employed an extremely aggressive style of play, “often punching first and not bothering with any questions later.”) 
(hereinafter “Hackel”) 
19 See Matthew P. Barry, Richard L. Fox & Clark Jones, Judicial Opinion on the Criminality of Sports violence in 
the United States, 15 Seton Hall. J. Sports & Ent. L. 1, 7, 6-15 (2005) (discussing the role of the enforcer) 
[hereinafter “Barry, Fox & Jones”]; see e.g., Yates & Gillespie, supra note 4 at 150 (stating “enforcers are kept on 
teams primarily for the fighting ability and to intimidate opponents.”) [hereinafter “Yates”]. 
20 Id. 
21 Id. 
22 Id. 
23 See Prust, supra note 11.  
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opposition reconsider his course of action, given the fact he may have to answer to the other team’s 
enforcer.   
At the same time, however, the role of the enforcer has become more than just a fan-shared 
fetish or strategy for winning games and protecting teammates.24  Instead, it has become a means 
to an end for less-talented, and otherwise marginally-skilled players to achieve their childhood 
dreams of playing in the National Hockey League.25  Although most enforcers would prefer to 
have achieved their dream of playing in the NHL on merit of their hockey skills, many are willing, 
but few are successful in opening the inimitable side entrance into the NHL as an enforcer.26  But 
one’s willingness to forge a path to the NHL with his fists and accept this inherently dangerous 
role is not ideal, especially considering the detrimental effects and health risks associated with 
fighting.27   
As exemplified by the National Football League’s recent concussion settlement, concerns 
regarding player-safety and excessive violence within the world of professional sports have 
become a highly contested and litigated issue.28  In light of the tragic deaths of former NHL 
                                                          
24 See Hackel, supra note 18.  Discussing how the acceleration of fighting in the NHL brought positive nationwide 
attention to the sport, as well as grave concerns about the overly violent nature of the game and player safety that 
“have yet to evaporate.” 
25 See Clune, supra note 7. 
26See e.g., John Branch, Derek Boogaard: Brain ‘Going Bad’, N.Y. Times (Dec. 6, 2011) available at 
http://www.nytimes.com/2011/12/06/sports/hockey/derek-boogaard-a-brain-going-
bad.html?pagewanted=5&emc=etal); see also John Branch, Boy On Ice – The Life and Death of Derek Boogaard, 
57-64 (2014) (Over six months, John Branch authored a novel and three-part series that examined the life and death 
of former NHL enforcer Derek Boogaard. Branch notes, “those who believe Boogaard loved to fight have it wrong. 
He loved what it brought: a continuation of an unlikely hockey career. And he loved what it meant: vengeance 
against a lifetime of perceived doubters and the gratitude of teammates glad that he would do a job they could not 
imagine”) [hereinafter “Branch’]. 
27 See Complaint at Law, Nelson v. Nat’l Hockey League, 20 F.Supp. 3d 650 (N.D. Ill. 2014), 2016 LEXIS 21028 
(No. 13 C 4846) (Complaint filed by Derek Boogaard’s family against the NHL) [hereinafter “Nelson v. NHL”].  
28 See Opinion of the Court, In Re: National football League Players Concussion Injury Litigation, (No. 15-2206) 
(3rd Cir. 2016) available at https://assets.documentcloud.org/documents/2804909/N-F-L-Settlement-Court-of-
Appeals-Opinion.pdf ( On April 18, 2016 the United States Court of appeals for the Third Circuit approved a $1 
billion settlement to compensate current and former National Football League Players who have been diagnosed 
with concussion-related injuries).  
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enforcers such as, Bob Probert, Steve Montador, and Wade Belak, many commentators accused 
the NHL of fostering a culture of excessive violence.29  But perhaps the most infamous of the 
recent tragedies was that of former NHL enforcer, Derek Boogaard.30  At 270-pounds and nearly 
seven feet tall on skates, Boogaard understood from a young age, that his unusually large stature 
would hinder his dreams of becoming a glorified goal-scorer in the NHL.31  Yet unlike countless 
others who unsuccessfully came before him, Boogaard learned to utilize his size and toughness, 
and was able to fist his way through the ranks of junior hockey and ultimately the NHL.32  
Throughout his six-year tenure as an NHL enforcer, Boogaard dressed for a total of 277 
games, scored only three goals, served 589 penalty minutes, and fought a record sixty-six times.33  
Nicknamed “the Boogeyman,” Boogaard was feared by opponent and respected by his teammates, 
thanks to his unmatched size and ability to overpower opponents.34  But masked behind his 
intimidating grin and inspirational toughness were swollen knuckles, broken bones, countless 
concussions, and a secret addiction to alcohol and oxycodone.35  At the age of 28 and in the prime 
of his career, Boogaard lost his final fight to addiction.36  Subsequently, Boogaard’s estate filed a 
wrongful-death lawsuit against the National Hockey League, which alleged the NHL failed to 
adequately protect and treat Boogaard for his injuries and addiction.37   
                                                          
29 See, Melanie Romero, Check to the Head: The Tragic Death of NHL Enforcer Derek Boogaard and the NHL’s 
Negligence – How Enforcers Are Treated as Second-class Employees, 22 Jeffrey S. Moorad Sport. L. J. 271-275 
(2015) (Current NHL Commissioner, Gary Bettman, is the only commissioner in major American professional 
sports to admit that fighting is a part of the game). 
30 Id. at 272. 
31 See Branch, supra note 26. 
32 Id. 
33 Id. 
34 Id. 
35 Id. 
36 Id. 
37 See Nelson v. NHL, supra note 27. 
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Unfortunately, Boogaard’s initial claims were deemed preempted under the federal Labor 
Management Relations Act, which requires all arbitration measures prescribed within the National 
Hockey League’s Collective Bargaining Act to be exhausted before commencement of a civil 
suit.38  Notwithstanding this unfavorable ruling Boogaard’s estate filed a second amended 
complaint in September of 2016.39  Consequently, the Boogaard lawsuit generated widespread 
attention regarding the League’s excessively violent culture and further illuminated the issue of 
whether fighting should remain a part of the game.40  Above all, the Boogaard complaints played 
an arguably critical role in the recent class action filing by the National Hockey League Players’ 
Association against the National Hockey League.41 
Separate from the Boogaard lawsuit, the National Hockey League Players’ Association 
(“NHLPA” or “Players”) similarly allege that the National Hockey League “has promoted 
unnecessary brutality and violence to become a dominant element of the game as played in the 
league.”42  Generally, the Players class contends that the League, 
[r]ather than exercise reasonable care in fulfilling its voluntarily assumed duty of 
care to its players, pursued a long-running course of fraudulent and negligent 
conduct to maintain and improve its economic advantage, which included failing 
to make any statements of substance about concussions, MTBI, and other brain 
injuries.43 
                                                          
38 See Nelson v. NHL, supra note 27 at 1-5 (denying the Boogaard estate’s motion to remand to state court because 
§301 of the Labor Management Relations Act permits federal courts to entertain contract disputes between an 
employer and a labor organization that are governed by a collective bargaining agreement); see e.g., 29 U.S.C.A. 
§185(a). 
39 See Second Amended Complaint at Law, Boogaard v. National Hockey League, 2016 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 134232 
(N.D. Ill. 2016) (No. 13 C 4846) available at https://dlbjbjzgnk95t.cloudfront.net/0846000/846404/170-main[1].pdf 
(U.S. District Court Judge, Gary Feinerman, held that claims I through IV, which allege the League harmed 
Boogaard by promoting violence in the NHL and remaining silent on the dangers associated with head trauma were 
triable claims and not otherwise preempted under the Labor Management Relations Act). 
40 See Romero, supra note 29. 
41 See NHL Concussion Litigation, supra note 1. 
42  Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint, In Re: National Hockey League Players’ 
Concussion Injury Litigation, MDL No. 14-2551 at 67 (SRN/JSM) (D. Minn. 2016). 
43  Id. at 89. 
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Although the Players concede that there is an inescapable level of violence that exists within 
professional ice hockey, when compared to other professional sports leagues such as the National 
Football League and even the National Basketball Association, it is apparent that the “violent 
dynamic of the NHL is wholly unique to the NHL.”44  For example, in both the National Football 
League and National Basketball Association, any player who fights, punches or attempts to punch 
another player, is to be immediately ejected from play and is often times subject to potential fines 
and suspensions.45  More specifically, in both the International Ice Hockey Federation and the 
National Collegiate Athletic Association, fighting is strictly prohibited.46  Therefore, if 
professional ice hockey is so obviously violent, why doesn’t the National Hockey League 
proscribe fighting altogether or enact specific measures that deter players from acting in an 
unnecessarily violent and hyper-aggressive manner? 
 The answer—as alleged in the NHLPA’s complaint —is that the NHL has “expressly and 
regularly acknowledged that it has capitalized on extreme violence, including fighting.”47  For 
example, in 1989, then NHL President, John Ziegler stated, “fighting is an acceptable outlet for 
the emotions that build up during play [and] until otherwise, it’s here to stay.”48  Moreover, in 
2011, current NHL Commissioner, Gary Bettman noted that “fan support was a specific reason 
why fighting and other extreme violence persists in the NHL.”49  If you have ever glanced at the 
                                                          
44 Id. at 73. 
45 Id. 
46  Id. at 74. 
47 Id. at 76. 
48 Id. at 78; see also Mary Clarke and Pat Iversen, The Most Interesting and Damning Details From the Unsealed 
Documents in the NHL Concussion Lawsuit, SB Nation (2016) available at: 
http://www.sbnation.com/nhl/2016/3/30/11333286/nhl-concussion-lawsuit-unsealed-emails-gary-bettman-colin-
campbell (the NHL released 297 documents as part of discovery in the concussion lawsuit. Included within were 
numerous emails from current NHL Commissioner Gary Bettman, as well as former League commissioners, 
presidents, responded to team owners’ concerns regarding player safety by labeling their players as “soft,” or 
“Greenpeace pukes […] that were responsible for their own injuries”). 
49 See NHL Concussion Litigation, supra note 1 at 78-79. 
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National Hockey League website, have seen one of its advertisements, or even played its officially 
licensed video game, violent hits and fights are prominently displayed and serve as a marketing 
tool for the League. 
However, in addition to generating revenue, Bettman’s rationale for violence and fighting 
is similar to those who believe it is a necessary mechanism for preventing and deterring further 
violence within the game.50  Accordingly, Bettman even suggested that enforcers were comparable 
to a “hockey thermostat, that helps cool things down when tension run high.”51  Nevertheless, the 
League contends it took adequate steps to protect its players.  For example, in 1979, the NHL 
instituted a mandatory helmet rule, in which all players were required to wear a league-issued 
helmet and refrain from deliberately removing it prior to an altercation.52  In 1997, the NHL created 
a Concussion Program, in which team physicians were required to document, study and maintain 
records of all players that reportedly suffered in-game concussions.53 
Conversely, the NHLPA alleges the League’s preventative measures were simply a ploy to 
make it seem as if they had a genuine interest in its players’ health and safety.  Accordingly, the 
results from the NHL Concussion Program, which took place over the course of seven regular 
seasons, from 1997 to 2004, were not disclosed to players until 2011.54  After withholding the 
findings for nearly seven years, the NHL finally disclosed the report.  Included within, team 
physicians recorded 559 concussions during the course of regular season play.55  Most alarmingly, 
                                                          
50 Id. at 79-82; See Yates, supra note 19. 
51 Id. 
52 Id. at 3. 
53 Id. at 3-6. 
54  Id. at 24-29; see e.g., Brian W. Benson M.D. Ph.D., et al., A Prospective Study of Concussions Among National 
Hockey League Players During Regular Season Games: The NHL-NHLPA Concussion Program, 905-911, CMAJ 
(2011), available at http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC3091898/pdf/1830905.pdf. 
55 Id. 
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twenty percent or nearly 112 of those 559 players returned to play in the same game in which they 
suffered the concussion.56  Moreover, the NHLPA contends that, “despite these findings, the report 
quickly sought to downplay their significance, concluding with the assurance that, essentially, no 
cause and effect relationship could be found between concussions and other head hits and the 
problems the Plaintiffs now experience.”57 
Notwithstanding the Players’ claims in light of their contentions that the NHL promoted a 
culture of excessive violence as a means to generate revenue, and failed to adequately warn and 
protect players from the neurological risks of head injuries suffered while playing in the NHL; the 
League has openly iterated their desire to pursue litigation and forgo any settlement discussions.58  
But perhaps the League should be more concerned with this ongoing suit.  Unlike the initial claims 
brought by the Boogaard estate, in which a majority of the claims were preempted under federal 
law, the League’s previous motion to dismiss on the grounds of federal labor law preemption were 
swiftly set aside.59 
Before analyzing the potential likelihood of success of the NHLPA’s tort-specific 
negligence claims, Part II of this article outlines the existing landscape of American tort law as 
related to personal injuries suffered as a result of athletic participation.  Accordingly, this overview 
                                                          
56 Id. 
57 Id. 
58 See Greg Wyshynski, NHL Has ‘No desire’ to Settle Concussion Lawsuit, Says Internal Memo, Yahoo Sports, 
(2015) available at http://sports.yahoo.com/blogs/nhl-puck-daddy/nhl-has--no-desire--to-settle-concussion-lawsuit--
says-internal-memo-165002717.html.  
59 See Memorandum Opinion and Order, In re: National Hockey League Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation, 
MDL 14-2551, 18-41 (SRN/JSM) (D. Minn.) (2016) (on May 16, 2016, United States District Court Judge, Susan 
Richard Nelson, issued a memorandum opinion and order denying the NHL’s motion to dismiss the NHLPA’s 
negligence claims on the grounds of federal labor law preemption). 
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will provide a more educated prediction of whether the NHLPA will likely succeed in its class 
action suit against the NHL.  
II. Conduct Giving Rise to Tort Liability in the Arena of Sports: 
 As the use of excessive force in the form of competitive violence has escalated within the 
arenas of professional and amateur sports, so too has the number of injured athletes who seek 
redress through civil courts.60  However, many courts prefer to refrain from and often attempt to 
limit their involvement to the most egregious cases in an effort to avoid having to grapple with 
unsettled and non-uniform state tort law.61  Articulating basic tort law concepts such as intent, 
consent, assumption of the risk and the scope of liability can pose a significant challenge in cases 
involving violent sports like professional ice hockey.  Especially considering most of the conduct 
that takes place on the ice could generally be subject to criminal or civil liability if taken place off 
the ice.62  Nonetheless, as excessive violence has become an increasingly common aspect of 
competitive sports, more and more claimants have opted to come to the courts for formal relief.  
 In the United States, the prevailing standard for recovery in sports-related tort claims is 
generally limited to injuries that occur as a result of intentional or reckless conduct.63  Although 
claims based on the theory of negligence are commonly dismissed as an inappropriate basis for 
recovery, a small minority of courts have been willing to entertain such claims if they implicate 
                                                          
60 Linda S. Calvert Hanson & Craig Dernis, Revisiting Excessive Violence in the Professional Sports Arena: 
Changes in the past Twenty Years? (1996) 6 Seton Hall J. Sports L. 127 
61 See Daniel S. Greene, From the Ice to the Courtroom: Analyzing the Relationship Between Professional Ice 
Hockey and Tort Liability, 23 Sport Law. J. 57, at 69 (2016) [hereinafter “Greene”]. 
62 See Greene, supra note 61 at 66; see e.g., Jeffrey A. Citron and Mark Ableman, Civil Liability in the Arena of 
Professional Sports, 36 U. Brit. Colum. L. Rev. 193, at 197 (2003) [hereinafter “Citron”]; Nicola Joyce, Too Many 
Men on the Ice?: Why Criminal Prosecutors Should Refrain From Policing On-Ice Violence in the NHL, Harvard 
John M. Olin Fellow’s Discussion Paper Series, No. 9 (2009). 
63 See Citron, supra note 62 at 197. 
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organizational negligence or involve injuries suffered as a result of participation in a recreational 
sports league.64  Additionally, many of these sports injury claims never reach fruition in part 
because of the maxim of volenti non fit injuria (no wrong is done to one who is willing to be 
injured).65  Consequently, this maxim, otherwise known as the doctrine of voluntary assumption 
of the risk, is often the hardest hurdle for claimants to overcome.66 
A. Intentional Tort Theory – Assault and Battery 
In the United States, claimants seeking redress for injuries that occur as a result of player 
to player conduct are generally required to assert something more than mere negligence.67  
Specifically, claimants generally must advance their claims on a theory of recklessness or assault 
and battery, i.e., intentional torts.68  Perhaps the most obvious theory giving rise to participant-to-
participant liability are claims based on the theory of intentional torts.  Under this theory, claimants 
generally allege that the defendant’s conduct constituted and an assault and or battery.69  In short, 
a defendant can be held liable for a battery if he intentionally causes an unprivileged, harmful 
contact with the claimant, and such contact actually occurred.70  Even if the harmful or offensive 
contact with the claimant did not occur, a defendant may be liable for an assault if the claimant 
                                                          
64 See e.g., Cameron J. Raines, Sports Violence: A Matter of Societal Concern, 55 Notre Dame L. Rev. 796 (1980); 
Gauvin v. Clark, 537 N.E.2d 94, 96-97 (Mass. 1989) (during a college hockey game, defendant speared the plaintiff 
in his midsection, causing serious injury to plaintiff. Although defendant’s actions were prohibited in all levels of 
hockey as a violation of the rules, the Massachusetts Supreme required plaintiff to demonstrate that defendant acted 
with a reckless disregard because “vigorous and active participation in sporting events should not be chilled by the 
threat of litigation”). 
65 See Keeton et. al., Prosser and Keeton on the Law of Torts, § 18 at 112 (5th ed. 1984); see also Restatement 
(Second) of Torts) § 10 (1965). 
66 Id. 
67 See Ray Yasser, In the Heat of Competition: Tort Liability of One Participant to Another: Why Can’t Participants 
be Required to be Reasonable, 5 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 253, 256 (1995). 
68 See Yasser, supra note 67 at 254-256. 
69 Id.  
70 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 18 (1965) (defining “Battery: Offensive Contact”). 
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can prove the defendant’s intentional conduct placed him in “imminent apprehension” of his life 
or safety.71   
In Averill v. Lutrell,72 plaintiff was a semi-professional baseball player.73  While at bat, the 
opposing pitcher gestured a threatening motion, suggesting his intent to “stick the next pitch in 
[plaintiff’s] ear.”74  After plaintiff successfully avoided being hit by three close pitches, the fourth 
brushed his arm.75  As plaintiff proceeded to take his base, he aggressively tossed his bat in the 
direction of the pitcher.76  Without any warning, the defendant catcher, stood up a struck plaintiff 
in the back of his head with his fist.77  Consequently, plaintiff was knocked unconscious and 
fractured his jaw upon falling face-first to the ground.78  The plaintiff sued the defendant for assault 
and battery and was awarded $5,000.79  Although the court in Averill focused heavily on the issue 
of respondeat superior, the court characterized the defendant’s actions as an impermissible, 
“willful [and] independent assault” on an unsuspecting player that fell entirely outside the scope 
of the game.80 
However, when considering the violent nature of contact sports such as ice hockey, which 
permits fighting and hyper-aggressive conduct, many claims advanced under this theory are not as 
successful as one might initially think.  For example, in McKichan v. St. Louis Hockey Club,81 the 
Missouri Court of Appeals for the Eastern District of Missouri held that a severe body check was 
                                                          
71 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 21 (1965) (defining “Assault”). 
72 311 S.W.2d 812 (Tenn. Ct. App. 1957). 
73 Averill, 311 S.W.2d 812, 813-814. 
74 Id. 
75 Id. 
76 Id. 
77 Id.  
78 Id. 
79 Averill, 311 S.W.2d 812, 815. 
80 Id. 
81 967 S.W.2d 209 (Mo. Ct. app. 1998). 
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not actionable as a matter of law because the hit at issue was an inescapable “a part of the game” 
of ice hockey.82  In McKichan, the plaintiff was a goaltender for a minor league hockey team that 
was affiliated with the NHL.83  Prior to the incident at issue, plaintiff skated out of his crease 
towards the near-side boards after the puck was sent over the glass and out of play.84  Even though 
the referee blew his whistle, signaling a stoppage in play, the defendant proceeded to skate in the 
direction of plaintiff at full speed.85  The referee took notice of the defendant’s actions and blew 
his whistle a second time.86  To no avail, the defendant ignored the whistle and ultimately delivered 
a gruesome body check on the unsuspecting plaintiff.87  The blow knocked the plaintiff into the 
boards and rendered him unconscious for nearly 30 minutes.88 
Accordingly, plaintiff sued both the defendant and the St. Louis Blues organization, and 
was awarded $175,000 in compensatory damages. 89  However, the Missouri Court of Appeals 
reversed, and ruled in favor of the defendants.90  Although the court did not explicitly prescribe an 
applicable standard of care, the court listed numerous factors that assisted their decision.  Such 
factors included: 
the ages and physical attributes of the participants, their respective skills 
and knowledge of the rules and customs, their status as amateurs or 
professionals, the type of risks which inhere to the game and those which 
are outside the realm of reasonable anticipation, the presence or absence of 
protective equipment, [and] the degree of zest with which the game is being 
played.91 
                                                          
82 McKichan, 967 S.W.2d 209, 213 (1998). 
83 McKichan, 967 S.W.2d 209. 
84 Id. at 210-211. 
85 Id. 
86 Id. 
87 Id. 
88 Id. 
89 Id. 
90 McKichan, 967 S.W.2d at 212-213. 
91 Id. 
17 
 
The court concluded that although the defendant’s conduct was extremely aggressive and 
constituted an intentional violation of the rules of the game, his actions were not outside the realm 
of reasonable anticipation considering the extremely violent nature of professional ice hockey.92  
Moreover, the court added, “for better or for worse, [violence and rough play] are part of the game 
of professional ice hockey.”93   
As exemplified by the Averill and, to a lesser extent, McKichan, decisions, intentional tort 
theories are considered a viable cause of action in the sports participant liability context.  However, 
most claims brought under this theory are generally successful only “when players step outside 
their roles as fellow competitors,” and go beyond what is ordinarily permissible by willfully or 
maliciously attacking one another.94  In the context of non-contact sports such as baseball, 
determining whether a participant acted with the requisite intent and malice seems rather 
straightforward considering violent conduct like that of the defendant in Averill, is generally 
deemed outside the scope of the game.  But in the context of contact sports such as ice hockey, the 
McKichan decision illustrates the courts’ laissez faire approach, which recognizes a cause of action 
only when “no player could reasonably anticipate the act.”95  Not only does this approach allow 
the courts to balance the basic tort law principle of volenti non fit injuria with the underlying 
                                                          
92 McKichan, 967 S.W.2d at 213. 
93 Id. 
94 See e.g., Overall v. Kadella, 361, N.W.2d 352, 352-356 (Mich. Ct. App. 1984) (plaintiff brought an action against 
defendant for injuries he sustained during a fight after an amateur hockey game. Plaintiff was knocked unconscious 
and suffered severe eye injury. The Michigan Court of Appeals affirmed the $46,000 judgement in favor of plaintiff, 
and held “there is a general agreement that an intention act, causing injury, which goes beyond what is ordinarily 
permissible, is an assault and battery for which recovery may be had”); Pfister v. Shusta, 657 N.E.2d 1013, 1014 
(1995) (in amateur contact sports, courts are generally more willing to entertain claims in which liability is 
predicated on “willful, wanton or intentional misconduct”). 
95 See Heidi C. Doerhoff, Penalty Box or Jury Box – Deciding Where Professional Sports Tough Guys Should Go, 
64 Mo. L. Rev., 755-58 (1999). 
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circumstances, but, as a practical matter, this heightened threshold is indicative of the courts’ 
preference to avoid unnecessary judicial oversight of professional competitive sports.96 
B. Recklessness Theory 
 The majority of state courts in the United States generally only require sports participants 
to show that the defendant’s conduct was reckless.  As defined within the Restatement (Second) 
of Torts,  
[an] actor's conduct is in reckless disregard of the safety of another if he 
does an act or intentionally fails to do an act which it is his duty to the other 
to do, knowing or having reason to know of facts which would lead a 
reasonable man to realize, not only that his conduct creates an unreasonable 
risk of physical harm to another, but also that such risk is substantially 
greater than that which is necessary to make his conduct negligent.97 
In short, recklessness falls somewhere in between the negligence theory and intentional tort theory.  
Accordingly, the recklessness threshold is higher than mere negligence because it requires a 
showing that the defendant knew or should have reasonably known that his actions, or lack thereof, 
created a substantially unreasonable risk of harm.98  Moreover, the recklessness threshold requires 
less than intentional torts because the claimant need only prove that the defendant acted 
intentionally or with conscious disregard.99  Comparatively, under the intentional tort theory, the 
claimant must show the defendant acted with the specific intent to cause a harmful result, beyond 
mere conscious disregard for the safety of another.100  Despite this lesser threshold, the doctrine of 
                                                          
96 See Doerhoff, supra note 95 at 756. 
97 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500, Reckless Disregard of Safety Defined (1965). 
98 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 500 cmt. g (1965). 
99 Id. 
100 Id. 
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assumption of risk remains an elusive concept in some jurisdictions as it would for claims brought 
under the intentional tort theory.101 
 In Nabozny v. Barnhill,102 the plaintiff, a high school soccer-goalkeeper, was severely 
injured during a match when the defendant, an opposing forward, kicked the plaintiff in the head.103  
During the course of regular play, the plaintiff positioned himself at the top of the penalty box and 
went down on his knee in an effort to retrieve and secure a rolling pass directed towards him.104  
As the plaintiff cradled the ball to his chest, the pursuing defendant continued onward in the 
direction of the plaintiff and proceeded to kick the plaintiff in the left side of his head.105  The 
plaintiff sued the defendant for damages caused by the alleged negligence of the defendant and the 
trial court ruled in favor of the defendant.106 
 On appeal, however, the Illinois Appellate Court reversed the trial court ruling and ordered 
a new trial.107  The Nabozny court acknowledged that “the law should not place unreasonable 
burdens on the free and vigorous participation in sports,” but further expressed, “some of the 
restraints of civilization must accompany every athlete on to the playing field.”108  The court held 
that in competitive sports in which the players are trained and thus, deemed knowledgeable of a 
set of rules primarily designed to protect players’ safety, owe a “duty to fellow competitors to 
refrain from conduct proscribed by such rules.”109  Accordingly, a player is potentially “liable for 
                                                          
101 Restatement (Second) of Torts cmt. b (1965). 
102 334 N.E.2d 258 (Ill. App. Ct. 1975). 
103 Nabozny, 334 N.E.2d at 260. 
104 Id. 
105 Id. 
106 Id. 
107 Id. at 261. 
108 Id. at 260-61. 
109 Id. 
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injury in a tort action if his conduct is such that it is either deliberate, willful or with a reckless 
disregard for the safety of the other player so as to cause injury to that player.”110   
Although the Nabozny court did not explicitly specify what constitutes reckless disregard, 
many jurisdictions subsequently adopted the Nabozny logic, requiring claimants to prove that the 
defendant acted either 1) willfully with the intent to injure; or 2) where intent cannot be proven, 
with an utter indifference or conscious disregard for the safety of others.111  In Hackbart v. 
Cincinnati Bengals,112 the plaintiff, a safety for the Denver Broncos, suffered a broken neck as a 
result of an altercation with the defendant, a running back for the Cincinnati Bengals.113  The 
incident at issue occurred when the plaintiff fell to the ground after attempting to block the 
defendant.114   As the play progressed up-field the defendant, “acting out of anger and frustration, 
but without specific intent to injure,” lunged forward and struck the kneeling plaintiff in the back 
of the head.115  The sheer force of defendant’s blow was so powerful that both players fell to the 
ground.116  However, because the referees did not observe the incident no subsequent penalty was 
assessed.117  Moreover, the plaintiff did not come to realize the severity of his injuries until the 
                                                          
110 Id. 
111 See e.g., Pfister v. Shusta, N.E.2d 1013 (Ill. 1995) (recreational participants have a duty to refrain from willful 
and wanton conduct); Ziarko v. Soo Line R.R. Co., 641 N.E.2d 402 (Ill. 1994); Crawn v. Campo, 643 A.2d 600 (N.J. 
1994); Knight v. Jewett, 834 P.2d 696 (Cal. 1992); Connell v. Payne, 814 S.W.2d 486 (Tex. Ct. App. 1991); Gauvin 
v. Clark, 537 N.E.2d 94 (Mass. 1989); but see Lestina v. West Band Mutual Ins. Co., 501 N.W.2d 28 (Wis. 1993) 
(Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the negligence standard applied to injuries incurred during a recreational soccer 
game and that the participants were required to exercise ordinary care under the circumstances). 
112 See Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 435 F. Supp. 352 (D. Colo. 1977), rev’d, Hackbart v. Cincinnati 
Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1979). 
113 See Hackbart, 435 F. Supp. At 353. 
114 Id. 
115 Id. 
116 Id. 
117 Id. 
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next day, when he began experiencing neck pain.118  Nonetheless, plaintiff’s career was abruptly 
ended as he was released from the team.  
Consequently, the plaintiff sued the defendant individually for reckless misconduct, as well 
as the defendant’s employing team for negligently failing to control their player.119  The U.S. 
District Court for the District of Colorado held that the plaintiff was not entitled to recovery, 
placing a great deal of emphasis on the inherently violent nature of professional football in relation 
with the doctrine of assumption of risk.120   The court compared the morality of the playing to that 
of a battlefield, and explained because the game is played “with a reckless-abandonment of self-
protective instincts,” the plaintiff “must have recognized and accepted the risk that he would be 
injured by such an act.”121  
On appeal, however, the Tenth Circuit reversed the district court ruling and stated, it is a 
fundamental policy of tort law that “for every injury wrongfully inflicted, some redress under the 
state law must be afforded since it is essential that citizens be able to look to their government for 
redress.”122  Unsatisfied with the district court’s reliance on the doctrine of assumption of risk, the 
Tenth Circuit further explained, “there are no principles of law which allow a court to rule out 
certain tortious conduct by reason of general roughness of the game or difficulty of administering 
it.”123  Similar to the appellate court in Nabozny, the Tenth Circuit highlighted the distinction 
between negligent misconduct and intentional and reckless conduct.124  The court concluded that 
even though the defendant lacked specific intent to injure required for an intentional tort claim, his 
                                                          
118 Id. 
119 See Hackbart, 435 F. Supp. At 355-356. 
120 Id. 
121 See Hackbart, 435 F. Supp. At 356-358. 
122 Hackbart v. Cincinnati Bengals, Inc., 601 F.2d 516, 523 (10th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 444 U.S. 931 (1979). 
123 See Hackbart, 601 F.2d at 520. 
124 Id. at 524 
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actions were more than a mere inadvertence.125  As in Nabozny, the Tenth Circuit went on to find 
that the defendant’s actions constituted reckless misconduct because he consciously disregarded 
specific rules of the game that were primarily designed to protect player-safety.126   
The Tenth Circuit’s holding in Hackbart “transmitted a sobering message to the sports 
establishment—if they cannot keep their own house clean, the courts will not hesitate to do it for 
them.”127  Accordingly, the Hackbart holding strengthened the principles established under 
Nabozny and reiterated the notion that sports participants, regardless of their amateur or 
professional status, will not be shielded from liability simply because they did not intend to cause 
harm.  Moreover, the Hackbart decision essentially rendered limitations imposed under the 
doctrine of assumption inapplicable to claims based on reckless misconduct.  The Tenth Circuit 
concluded that mere participation in such violent sports does not manifest consent to such reckless 
or proscribed conduct of other participants.  Following Nabozny and Hackbart, a sports participant 
may be liable for an injury cased to a fellow competitor if 1) he acted with specific intent to bring 
about a specific harm; or 2) he intended the act committed, but lacked sufficient knowledge or 
consciously disregarded the reasonable likelihood significant harm would result. 
C. Negligence Theory and the Application of Assumption of Risk. 
Generally, most courts that have been willing to entertain sports participant liability claims 
have demonstrated a reluctance to recognize actions for simple negligence, and instead require 
claimants to bring such claims under either an intentional tort theory or recklessness theory.128  As 
                                                          
125 Id. (“the Defendant admittedly acted impulsively and in the heat of anger, and even though it could be said from 
the facts that he intended the act, it could also be said that he did not intend to inflict the serious injury which 
resulted”). 
126 Id. at 521. 
127 See Cameron J. Raines, supra note 64 at 803.  
128 See Nabozny, 334 N.E.2d at 261. 
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defined within the Restatement (Third) of Torts, a person may be liable for negligently causing 
physical harm to another if the actor 1) has a duty to exercise reasonable care under the 
circumstances; 2) it is reasonably foreseeable that his conduct will cause, or is likely to cause 
physical harm; and 3) the actor’s unreasonable conduct is the factual cause of the claimants 
harm.129  Consequently, the majorities’ reluctance is in recognition of the fact that subjecting 
another participant to an unreasonable risk of harm—the essence of a negligence claim— is a 
fundamental element of contact sports such as football and hockey.130  Thus, the majorities’ 
rationale is essentially predicated on the doctrine of assumption of risk.   
In McKichan, the court dismissed the plaintiff’s negligence claim against the defendant’s 
employing organization, and ruled the doctrine of assumption of risk precluded liability for injuries 
that arise from risks inherent to the sport of ice hockey.131  Even though the defendant’s illegal 
check arguably constituted recklessness under the Nabozny and Hackbart frameworks, the court 
opined that doctrine precluded plaintiff’s negligence claims because physical conduct and 
aggressive body-checks are a fundamental part of the game of ice hockey.132  Notwithstanding the 
majorities’ unwillingness to recognize sports torts negligence claims, there are a minority of 
jurisdictions that have permitted such claims to proceed.  However, it is important to note that 
                                                          
129 Restatement (Third) of Torts § 6, cmt. B (1965) (listing the elements of a prima facie negligence claim). 
130 See Hackbart, 601 F.2d at 520. 
131 See e.g., McKichan, 967 S.W.2d at 213 
132 See e.g., McKichan, 967 S.W.2d at 213; Karas v. Strevell, 884 N.E.2d 122, 134 (Ill. 2008) (participants are 
deemed to have breached a duty of care to co-participants on if he acts intentionally or so recklessly as to be totally 
outside the range of ordinary activity involved in the sport.  Plaintiff’s negligence claims were dismissed because he 
assumed the ordinary risk of being checked from behind during an amateur hockey game); Borque v. Duplechin, 331 
So.2d 40, 42 (La. Ct. App. 1976), cert. denied, 3354 So.2d 210 (La. 1976) (although the court termed the 
defendant’s conduct “negligent,” the thrust of the majority opinion supports the notion that sports participants 
invariably assume risks incidental to the particular sport that are created by a co-participant’s negligence but not 
necessarily recklessness); Ray Yasser, In the Heat of Competition: Tort Liability of One Participant to Another: 
Why Can’t Participants be Required to be Reasonable, 5 Seton Hall J. Sport L. 253, 256 (1995). 
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most of these cases involve participation in nonprofessional sports and thus, are not relevant to the 
analysis of this note.133  
Although courts have not generally spelled it out, there is an apparent, logical relationship 
between the foreseeability of violence, particularly violence that is not part of the game, itself, and 
the doctrine of assumption of risk.  In non-contact sports, such as baseball and soccer, the 
correlation between foreseeability of harmful conduct and assumption of the risk is somewhat 
clearer than in comparison to contact sports.  For example, in the Averill and Nabozny decisions, 
the court’s decision can be explained by the nature of the sport: violent or hyper-aggressive 
conduct is substantially less likely to occur because violent conduct is not a natural or expected 
aspect of the game of baseball and soccer, respectively.  Both the batter in Averill and the 
goaltender in Nabozny could not have reasonably assumed the risks associated with the defendants’ 
conduct because the expectation for such violent and injurious conduct was highly unforeseeable, 
given the non-violent nature of the sports at hand.  Consequently, a participant’s presumed 
assumption of the risks associated with the sport generally decreases as the likelihood or 
foreseeability of violent conduct decreases.  To the contrary, in contact sports such as hockey and 
football, a participant is presumed to have assumed a greater amount of risks because violent 
conduct is more foreseeable when considering the violent nature of the game.  
Through that lens, the McKichan decision makes some sense.  There, the court adopted a 
circumstantial approach and emphasized certain conduct, such as a severe and illegal body check 
on an unsuspecting player, was considered an inescapable aspect of the game of ice hockey.  
                                                          
133 See e.g., Lestina v. West Blend Mutual Ins. Co., 501 N.W. 2d 28 (Wis. 1993); Niemczyk v. Burleson, 538 S.W.2d 
737 (Mo. Ct. App. 1976); Lutterman v. Studer, 217 N.W.2d 756 (Minn. 1974); but see Babych v. McRae, 567 A.2d 
1269 (Conn. Super. Ct. 1989) (professional hockey player’s negligence cause of action permitted because 
Connecticut law did not bar negligence actions in the context of co-participant sports injury claims). 
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Although the defendant’s conduct might have been proscribed under the rules of the game, the 
McKichan court ruled that such illegal body checks were not outside the reasonable realm of 
anticipation.   
However, it becomes evident that the correlation between dangerousness and assumption 
of the risk is problematic when it comes to violent conduct that is not generally expected or 
accepted as a part of the game.  In both the McKichan and Hackbart decisions, the court grappled 
with the issue of whether or not the injured claimants had assumed the risks associated with such 
violent and aggressive sports.  In Hackbart, the court emphasized the fundamental policy rationale 
of tort law and stressed the need for appropriate redress regardless of the violent nature of the 
sport.  On the one hand, it is not obviously unreasonable to conclude that since a player has 
assumed the risk to get hit in a dangerous manner by another player in the course of the game 
within the rules has also, thereby, assumed the risk of being hit by another player in a dangerous 
manner in the course of the game in violation of the rules.  On the other hand, there can be no 
doubt that a player is also much more likely to guard themselves against injuries that come from 
rule-compliant conduct than against injuries that come from rule-violating conduct.  
The reasoning in McKichan and other like-minded cases leaves claimants in hockey with 
only one option: those torts that do not allow for assumption of risk—namely, intentional torts 
and, to a lesser extent, recklessness.134  Courts generally do not accept that intentional, injurious 
conduct is something that is part of the general risks of an activity that can be assumed by a 
participant.  In sports, participants might consent to such conduct, but a participant might assume 
                                                          
134 Compare Restatement (second) of Torts § 496A (limiting assumption of the risk to negligent and reckless 
conduct and City of Santa Barbara v. Superior Court, 41 Cal.4th 747, 751 (2007) “an agreement made in the context 
of sports or recreational programs or services, purporting to release liability for future gross negligence, generally is 
unenforceable as a matter of public policy.”). 
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the risk of being carelessly body checked but not the risk of being mugged or sucker-punched from 
behind.  To be sure, a participant might consent to conduct within the bounds of the sport’s rules 
(or just beyond them), but it is not a question of assumption of the risk.  This means that when a 
player complains of an intentional tort, the primary hurdle that they must clear is consent.  When 
viewed through that lens, it is unreasonable to conclude that a player has consented to violent 
actions against them that go well beyond the rules of the game. 
III. The Dennis Wideman Incident & NHL Concussion Litigation 
 A. The Wideman Incident  
On January 27, 2016, former NHL Linesman, Don Henderson, was forcefully struck in the 
back of his neck/head by Calgary Flames defenseman, Dennis Wideman.135  The incident occurred 
as Wideman, who had appeared to have been disoriented from a previous hit, skated towards to 
bench area in attempt to exit the ice.136 Within feet of the bench and “without provocation, 
Wideman grasped his stick with both hands and forcefully struck Henderson from behind with the 
shaft of his stick.”137  As a result of the hit, Henderson suffered significant injuries and was forced 
to retire from his position as an NHL linesman.138  Wideman was subsequently suspended and 
fined by the NHL.139  Accordingly, the ongoing suit between the NHL and the Players’ Association 
pertains primarily to the legality of Wideman’s suspension.  However, for purposes of this article, 
these facts provide a hypothetical landscape perfect for illustrating the potential application of law 
if Henderson were to file a civil suit against Wideman.  
                                                          
135 See Cooper, supra note 2. 
136 See Complaint, National Hockey League v. National Hockey League Players’ Assoc., 16-cv-04287 at 2 (S.D.N.Y. 
2016) available at http://thewhitebronco.com/nhl-sues-nhlpa-over-wideman-suspension/. 
137 Id. 
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Based on the legal frameworks set forth above, Henderson would have to bring a claim 
against Wideman and allege Wideman acted either intentionally or with recklessness.  Under the 
intentional tort theory, Henderson would need to prove that Wideman had intent to make an 
objectively harmful or offensive contact.140  Under the Averill holding, Henderson would need to 
show that Wideman’s conduct constituted an impermissible, “willful [and] independent assault” 
on an unsuspecting player that fell entirely outside the scope of the game.141  Moreover, under the 
McKichan holding, Henderson would need to show that Wideman’s actions constituted an 
intentional violation of the rules of the game and were outside the realm of reasonable 
anticipation142 
For arguments sake, if Henderson could not prove Wideman had the requisite intent to 
injure, he could potentially assert a cause of action under the recklessness theory as iterated in 
Nabozny143 and Hackbart.144  Henderson would need to prove 1) Wideman intended to commit his 
actions; and 2) his conduct constituted a conscious disregard of the reasonable likelihood 
significant harm would result.145  Accordingly, under both Nabozny and Hackbart, such reckless 
misconduct can be established by a showing that a participant acted with a conscious disregard of 
specific rules primarily designed to protect player-safety.146 
Accordingly, Henderson may have difficulty proving Wideman acted with specific intent 
to injure because Wideman claims to have been concussed just prior to the incident.147  
                                                          
140 Restatement (Second) of Torts § 18 (1965) (defining “Battery: Offensive Contact”). 
141 Averill, 311 S.W.2d 812 at 815. 
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145 Id. 
146 Nabozny, 334 N.E.2d at 261. 
147 See Appeal of Dennis Wideman Suspension, National Hockey League v. National Hockey League Players’ 
Assoc., James Oldham, Neutral Discipline Arbitrator for the National Hockey League (2016) available at 
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Notwithstanding any difficulties relating to this intent threshold, Henderson may have a stronger 
claim under the recklessness theory because Wideman’s conduct could be considered a conscious 
disregard for Henderson’s safety.  Unlike the aforementioned cases, this situation is particularly 
unique because it involves a referee and not a co-participant.  Thus, one might contend that any 
implications relating to the assumption of risk are explicitly irrelevant because unlike players, 
referees are not similarly situated to the extent they do not have a reasonable expectation of being 
deliberately body-checked or mugged from behind by a player. 
For example, a referee may be deemed to have assumed the risk of injury if while 
attempting to break up a fight, he was punch accidentally by a player.  But under these facts, it is 
highly unlikely that a fact finder could conclude that a referee assumed the risk of injury because 
the rules of the game explicitly prohibit players from recklessly and intentionally applying physical 
force directed towards a referee.148  Moreover, Wideman’s conduct was completely unexpected 
and unforeseeable because his actions were not considered a part of the game.  These facts provide 
a great illustration of how the foreseeability of violence and the assumption of risk relate to one 
another.   
Although Henderson may have consented and even assumed some of the risks associated 
with being on the ice, as a referee, Henderson is comparable to an innocent bystander, and thus, 
could not have reasonably assumed the risk of being mugged from behind by Wideman.  If 
Henderson were an opposing player, perhaps the court, like in McKichan, would conclude that 
Henderson assumed such risks given the uniquely violent nature of ice hockey.  However, because 
Wideman’s actions were in direct violation of the NHL rules, and arguably an intentional form of 
                                                          
148 National Hockey League Official Rules 2015-2016, Rule 40.2, Automatic Suspension, available at: 
http://www.nhl.com/nhl/en/v3/ext/rules/2015-2016-Interactive-rulebook.pdf (2015). 
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retaliation against Henderson for a previously missed call, one might argue that Henderson is in a 
favorable position to assert a meritorious claim against Wideman.  
 B. The NHL Concussion Litigation  
As previously mentioned, the National Hockey League Players’ Association and the 
National Hockey League are in the midst of a class action lawsuit, in which the Players allege the 
League acted recklessly and negligently by failing to warn and adequately protect players from the 
adverse effects of repeated concussions and head trauma; and instead promoted a culture of 
unreasonable and unnecessary violence.149  Specifically, the Players allege that the League fostered 
a culture of excessive violence as a means of generating revenue and developing a greater fan 
base.150  Moreover, the Players contend that the League acted recklessly because the NHL knew 
or reasonably should have known, as a result of the 2011 Concussion Program data, “that repeated 
concussive impacts that the Players endured while playing in the NHL likely put them at 
substantially-increased risks of developing one or more neurodegenerative diseases or conditions, 
including, but not limited to, dementia, ALS, CTE, Alzheimer’s disease, Parkinson’s disease, and 
any cognitive, or behavioral conditions associated with such.”151 
Even though many commentators have suggested the Players have presented weak claims 
against the League,152 it will be interesting to witness how the suit plays out in the coming months.  
Some commentators have even gone so far as to suggest that the recent $1 billion settlement in the 
National Football League will incentivize the NHL to settle the suit and extinguish such negative 
                                                          
149 Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Consolidated Class Action Complaint, In Re: National Hockey League Players’ 
Concussion Injury Litigation, MDL No. 14-2551 at 102-111, (SRN/JSM) (D. Minn. 2016). 
150 Id. 
151 Id. at 102. 
152 See McGowan, supra note 16 at 26 (suggesting the NHLPA has a weak claim considering players consent to the 
inherently violent nature of hockey and thus, will have trouble refuting a lack of consent or assumption or risk).  
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attention.153  However, considering the lack of scientific evidence connecting repetitive blows to 
the head and long term health risks, it is very possible that the NHL refuses to settle and instead 
fights the Players in court.  
i. Significant Challenges Affecting the Players’ Claims  
Admittedly, the Players are at a distinct disadvantage because the majority of courts in the 
United States refuse to permit such sport torts claims on the basis of negligence.  Notwithstanding 
this general reluctance, the Players’ claims are only the second of its kind, behind the National 
Football League’s.  Considering that case settled out of court prior to trial, it remains unclear 
whether a federal judge will permit an organizational negligence cause of action.  On the other 
hand, because the Players also alleged that the League acted recklessly, under the Nabozny and 
Hackbart frameworks, one might argue their claims are not as weak as they may seem. 
As a threshold matter, the Players must establish that the League has a duty to care for its 
players.  The League controls the rules of the game, the equipment the players wear, and even the 
medical protocol and monitoring players must complete before returning to play.  Accordingly, 
this is substantive proof that the League has taken it upon themselves to protect the players from 
foreseeable harms associated with playing professional ice hockey and assumed the duty to take 
reasonable efforts to that end.  When determining whether the League breached this duty, the 
Players have an arguably sturdy claim considering the League, as evidenced by current and former 
commissioners’ statements,154 used violence as a means of generating profits.  Yet despite the 
barbaric and extremely unsafe nature of fighting and violence in hockey, this contention only 
                                                          
153 See Ken Belson and Jeff Klein, N.F.L. Concussion Case Offers Clues For Hockey Lawsuit, New York Times 
(2013) available at http://www.nytimes.com/2013/11/27/sports/hockey/nfl-concussion-case-offers-clues-for-hockey-
lawsuit.html. 
154 See Mary Clarke and Pat Iverson, supra note 48. 
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supports the notion that the League breached its duty towards the Players and does not establish 
the requisite element of causation.   
 a. Causation and the Assumption of Risk 
Assuming this suit does in fact go all the way to trial and does not settle out of court, the 
Players could face a significant hurdle with respect to proving causation because most, if not all 
of the players included in the class, may have great difficulty proving the Leagues’ actions, or lack 
thereof, were the proximate cause of their injuries.  Most notably, the Players will likely face great 
difficulty establishing causation given the lack of scientific data connecting repetitive blows to the 
head and long-term health risks.  Moreover, the relationship between the foreseeability of violence 
and whether the Players assumed the risks associated with such a uniquely violent sport will play 
a critical role in determining whether the Players have a viable theory of causation. 
As previously mentioned, the McKichan court determined that the plaintiff in that case 
assumed the risk of being illegally and forcefully body checked because such violence was a part 
of the inescapable aspects of the game.  Like in McKichan, the Players will likely have great 
difficulty contending they did not assume the risks associated with the violent nature of hockey 
because aggressive stick slashes and fighting are also considered inescapable elements of the 
game. But the players are not required to fight or play with a reckless abandonment in order to 
win.  Instead, the winner is determined by the team who scores the most goals.  Although fighting 
may have an indirect impact on the outcome of a game, i.e., a favorable shift in momentum, it by 
no means dictates which team will win.   
As in McKichan, the court may give a great amount of deference to the circumstances 
surrounding the Players claims.  Specifically, these players are highly-skilled, trained, professional 
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athletes and are deemed to have a reasonable understanding and expectation of the foreseeable 
risks associated with the violent nature of ice hockey.155 
Given the unique nature of professional ice hockey and the propensity for violence, the 
court may reasonably conclude that the Players assumed the risks of potential injury and therefore 
lack the requisite causation to establish a meritorious claim.  For example, Derek Boogaard fought 
over sixty times throughout his career in the NHL.  However, considering he fought hundreds, if 
not thousands of times throughout his entire hockey career, the requisite connection for causation 
seems blurred.  Like Derek Boogaard, the Players would have to establish a nexus between the 
Leagues’ duty to protect their health and safety, and their asserted injuries. This will likely cause 
a significant challenge for the Players especially when considering some of the players included 
in the class have been playing hockey since they were young boys.  Moreover, a vast majority of 
the players also played long careers in the minors and at the collegiate level.  Consequently, the 
League might contend that because these players spent a majority of time playing in a league other 
than the NHL, there is no reasonable basis to conclude that their injuries were not foreseeable and 
that the League was responsible for their alleged injuries. 
Yet, the Players may have a strong counter argument if confronted with allegations that 
contend they assumed the risk of injury by participating in such a uniquely violent sport.  As in 
Nabozny and Hackbart, where participants assumed the risk of injury inherent to the nature of the 
game, here, the players could argue that, while they might have consented to the inherent risks 
associated with the sport, they did not consent or assume the risks of the long-term health 
complications as set forth in the complaint.  For example, such inherent risks may include injuries 
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such as lacerations, dislodged teeth and broken bones from fighting and ordinary rough or violent 
play.   
 b. Class Certification 
Like sport tort cases brought by individual claimants, the Players’ class action has many 
parallels, but also unique challenges that individual plaintiffs otherwise do not face.  For example, 
unlike individual claimants, the Players must establish that the class of representative is 
appropriate and that the class of claimants share a common injury.  Additionally, individual 
claimants generally have a greater control over litigation strategies, specifically, whether to accept 
a proposed settlement offer.  Conversely, the class of Players must come to a mutual agreement, 
among other requirements, prior to accepting a proposed settlement offer. 
The class of Players in this suit could contend—like in the Henderson—that they never 
assumed the specific risks relating to concussions because they did not know, nor were they 
reasonably capable of knowing, the alarmingly negative health risks associated with such a violent 
sport, although the League was in the position to know those things and prevent them through the 
threat of greater sanctions or taking other defensive measures.  To further support this contention 
the Players have asserted that their lack of knowledge and subsequent injury, regardless of their 
assumption of the risk, was in part caused by the League, considering the League withheld 
unfavorable medical data from their 2011 Concussion Program for nearly seven years.156  This 
contention could play a critical role when establishing causation, especially considering that the 
players are likely disadvantaged under the doctrine of assumption of risk.  
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Additionally, this issue of causation also implicates challenges relating to whether or not 
the Players will be granted certification as a proper class of plaintiffs.  As of January 2017, the 
League and Players are currently awaiting a ruling relating to the appropriateness of the class of 
plaintiffs.157  However, the court may likely conclude that the class of plaintiffs is improper for 
this litigation because they lack commonality.  In order to gain certification as a proper class of 
plaintiffs, the class must generally establish, among other minor elements, that the individual 
plaintiffs seeking redress share a common injury that can be practically adjudicated by the 
courts.158  Accordingly, the League may have a strong argument in support of denying class 
certification to the Players because not all of the plaintiffs in the proposed class necessarily share 
the same type or timing of injury.  
For example, some of the listed plaintiffs played in the League nearly thirty years ago.  
During that period, neither the League nor the players knew or should have had reason to know of 
the potentially adverse health risks associated with playing professional hockey.  Moreover, the 
fact that these plaintiffs played at different times creates further challenges relating to the 
application and limitations imposed by various collective bargaining agreements.  For instance, 
some of the younger claimants may not have a proper claim in court if the collective bargaining 
agreement governing the Players at the times of their alleged injuries required arbitration relating 
such claims.  Whereas older players, who were presumably governed by a different collective 
bargaining agreement might not have been limited in such a way.  Although the court has 
previously ruled that the current collective bargaining agreement does not impose any hurdles for 
                                                          
157 See In re National Hockey League Players’ Concussion Injury Litigation, Memorandum of Law in Support of 
Plaintiffs’ Motion for Class Certification, 14-MD-02551 (SRN/JSM), 2016 available at 
http://www.nhlconcussionlitigation.com/assets/htmldocuments/Memo of Law.pdf 
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the class of plaintiffs, it will be interesting to see if the League contends that previous agreements 
should be applied to these claims.  
IV. Conclusion 
As previously mentioned, professional ice hockey is perhaps the most dangerous and 
violent sport, considering the natural and inescapable elements of the game.  In addition to the 
weapon-like equipment and violent body checks that occur at remarkably high speeds, hockey is 
the only modern day sport that openly tolerates its players to fight.  Yet unlike sports in which 
fighting has a direct impact on the winner of the game, hockey is unique because its inclusion of 
fighting is like pouring gasoline on an already violent fire of a sport.  Although some players and 
fans alike contend that fighting and hyper-aggressive conduct is a necessary mechanism to keep 
the game safe, this paradoxical rationale is obviously flawed given the recent class action 
concussion lawsuit and alleged injuries.  
Based on the general tort law principles relating to sport torts claims, it remains unclear 
whether the League or the Players will come out on top of the ongoing litigation.  Because hockey 
is so uniquely violent, the court, unlike those that previously entertained sport tort cases, will very 
likely face significant challenges relating to whether the Players assumed the foreseeable risks 
associated with playing such a violent sport.  Moreover, it will be interesting to see if the Players 
will succeed on the merits as a class, or if certain claimants opt out to pursue individual claims 
against the League or individual wrongdoers.  As a class action, the plaintiffs are more likely to 
experience more challenges as a result of the class certification requirements, the potential 
application of previous collective bargaining agreements, and the difficulties associated with 
causation and assumption of the risk.  
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Notwithstanding the potential challenges associated with the ongoing suit, it is important 
to emphasize that the court hearing the NHL Concussion lawsuit has the opportunity to step up 
and hold professional sports organizations accountable for their failure to protect their players’ 
safety and wellbeing.  It is somewhat bizarre to think that no modern-day court has explicitly ruled 
such violent and grossly negligent conduct as inexcusable on the field of play because such 
violence should be expected by participants.  As a result of the courts unwillingness to provide a 
clear set of directives relating to the potential application of law to sport tort cases, the courts have 
created a great deal of tension between the fundamental policies of law and its potential application 
to sports tort cases.   
Specifically, the courts have focused far too much on the violent nature of the sport at hand 
and the foreseeability of harm, rather than the wrongful conduct at issue.  Consequently, this has 
created an odd relationship: as the foreseeability of violence in sports increases, a participant’s 
potential claim becomes less actionable.  This creates a perverse incentive where leagues that 
exploit the violent nature of a sport for profit receive greater tort protection through assumption of 
the risk than those leagues that are generally less violent and exploitative.  Regardless of the violent 
nature of sports, the courts should not be given deference to determine whether an injured 
participant has a viable claim based on the courts subjective perception of the foreseeability of 
potentially violent conduct.  The underlying policy rationale of tort law is to provide protection, 
safety and appropriate redress for injured claimants.  Allowing the courts to determine whether a 
claimant assumed the risk of injury based on the courts understanding of the violent nature of a 
specific sport completely undermines and frustrates this policy rationale.   
Instead, the courts should direct return to the frameworks as iterated in Hackbart and 
Nabozny, and direct their attention to the alleged wrongful conduct rather than the violent nature 
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and circumstances of the sport involved.  If the courts continue to turn a blind eye towards sport 
tort cases, specifically organizational claims, players’ unions may be forced to strike until their 
governing league succumbs to the players’ demands for greater protection.  
